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PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE ENERGY: DOES INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP HELP?                                                                                                                                               
1. Introduction 
In spite of the urgency of climate change and the rapid pace of technological change, change in the 
dominant logic of the energy sector is slow. For example, coal, natural gas and oil are still the largest 
energy sources in IEA countries, and energy efficiency has made only small inroads into total primary 
energy consumption (IEA 2018). While technological path dependencies are well known, recent 
research has highlighted the path dependence of institutions that further slow down socio-technical 
change (Unruh 2000; Araújo 2014). New energy technologies have achieved rapid technological 
progress and cost reductions, yet policies and regulations set initially to control and improve the 
functioning of the energy system have become hard to change due to established interests and 
institutionalized rules and practices (Kern and Smith, 2008 Geels 2014; Kuzemko et al., 2016; Winskel 
2018). Institutional rules, upheld by industry incumbents, include expectations for affordable and 
uninterrupted energy deliveries relying on economies of scale using non-renewable, dense energy 
resources. 
Previous research on energy sector change has drawn, for example, on new institutionalist concepts 
of policy change1 (Kuzemko et al., 2016) and historical institutionalism (Lockwood et al. 2017; 
Rodríguez-Morales 2018). We focus on institutional change in the energy field, including both policy 
and market actors (Zietsma et al. 2017), where institutional rules are enforced by standards, 
professional practices, the natural monopolies of distribution networks, and financial barriers to entry. 
The energy field has a distinct core/periphery structure, with new entrants vying for market share. 
New entrants have recently benefited from rapid developments in digitalization, which have also 
enabled the entry of non-energy companies, e.g. ICT and building services, into the field (Erlinhagen 
and Markard 2012). This has engendered some institutional change: for example, new rules for grid 
operators and suppliers regarding smart metering and prosumers; yet such change has lagged behind 
technological development due to resistance by incumbents (Kungl 2015; Schmid 2016). New entrants 
are supported by social movements and political debates (Kuzemko 2014), giving the state and 
governmental organizations a bridging role (Zietsma et al. 2017). While institutional change can derive 
from new entrants, NGOs, think tanks or academia, Kivimaa (2014) and Polzin et al. (2016) have shown 
                                                             
1 The literature on institutional entrepreneurship has several links to literatures on policy change, though it envisages 
institutional change in the broader institutional field (Zietsma et al. 2017), encompassing both markets and policies, as well 
as both formal and informal rules. Kingdon’s (1984) concepts of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘multiple streams’ are effectively 
similar to concepts in institutional entrepreneurship. Several studies of institutional entrepreneurship focus on policy 
change from an institutional-organizational perspective (Perkmann and Spicer 2007; Wijen and Ansari 2007; Buhr 2012). 
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that government-affiliated organisations can play an important role in bridging institutional 
innovation.  
Institutionalist analysis struggles to conceptualize change, since agents are viewed as institutionally 
embedded, i.e., conditioned to follow rules. Institutional entrepreneurship is body of research focusing 
on institutionally embedded agents who “break with existing rules and practices associated with the 
dominant institutional logics and institutionalize the alternative rules, practices or logics they are 
championing” (Garud et al. 2007, p. 962). In social theory, analyses of how institutional entrepreneurs 
work have cast light on fundamental issues of structure and agency (Lounsbury et al. 2003; Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012). Yet recent research on institutional entrepreneurship has turned to emphasizing 
its practical value: understanding how institutional entrepreneurship works might enable potential 
change makers to surmount the constraints of their institutional environment (Dover and Lawrence 
2010) and find solutions to ‘grand challenges’ (Ferraro et al.  2015) like energy transitions (Andrews-
Speed 2018). Given that there are several relevant bodies of social science literature that offer practical 
advice for creating a better energy system (see Sovacool 2014), it is valid to question the additional 
value of the institutional entrepreneurship concept. 
Within the energy field, Jolly et al. (2016) have explored how various types of institutional 
entrepreneurship have promoted wind power differently in India and Finland. Buhr (2012) investigated 
how timely social mobilization aligned with problem-awareness, policy and political streams to create 
the conditions for including aviation within the European Emissions Trading Scheme. Yet the power of 
institutional entrepreneurs has also been called into question by authors emphasizing contradictory 
forces, unintended consequences and failures (Lawrence et al. 2011; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016) 
– i.e., the limited control that individuals have when attempting to change entire sectors and the rules 
that govern them. Limits to control are compounded by the importance of timing in the alignment of 
internal and external conditions for change (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Buhr 2012) – suggesting that 
hindsight analyses of institutional entrepreneurship might be accounts more of luck than of skill. There 
are, thus, genuine knowledge gaps concerning whether the institutional entrepreneurship literature 
can deliver relevant and actionable management advice for sustainable energy practitioners. 
The present study aims to explore the practical value of the instutional entrepreneurship literature 
through collaborative inquiry (van de Ven and Johnson 2006). Our collaborative inquiry engages with 
government-affiliated organizations that have been trying to create alternative, more sustainable 
institutions in the energy field for distributed renewable energy and energy efficiency in Finland, a 
country where strong institutions and close elites have governed the energy sector for decades 
(Ruostetsaari 2010). Organizations working in this sector, in Finland and elsewhere, still tend to follow 
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a techno-economic rationale (Lutzenhiser 2014). We have attempted to engage people from these 
organizations in an exploration of the more political aspects of their work, drawing on propositions 
from the institutional entrepreneurship literature.  In order to engage the organizations and their work 
in this exploration, and to learn whether and how they could benefit from it, we employ a mixed-
methods collaborative inquiry process involving archival analysis, group discussions and longitudinal 
interviews. Our research questions are: (1) Do lessons from the institutional entrepreneurship 
literature help sustainable energy practitioners understand the political aspects of their work? And (2) 
given the contingency of institutional entrepreneurship, can people consistently organize to capture 
opportunities for institutional change?  
The following section identifies selected insights for sustainable energy practitioners from the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature. We then present our collaborative inquiry context and 
methods. We present our findings and analysis in the form of the stories of the organizations involved 
in our study, how they reinterpreted their work in the light institutional entrepreneurship concepts, 
and how they might organize more effectively for change. These are followed by a discussion of the 
findings and the limitations of the study, and conclusions.     
 
2. Institutional entrepreneurs combine grand strategy with everyday tactics 
Institutional entrepreneurs can include, for example, businesses creating new industrial models, NGOs 
(Lounsbury et al. 2003; Levy et al. 2010) or public sector organizations breaking out of bureaucratic 
iron cages (Wijen and Ansari 2012). Institutional entrepreneurship is seen as a form of collective action 
(van de Ven and Hargreave 2004; Jolly et al. 2016), employing social mobilization to align diverse 
interests and challenge incumbent field rules (Lounsbury 2003). Yet there is limited in-depth analysis 
of how collective institutional entrepreneurs might systematically organize their work vis-à-vis 
temporal opportunities on an ongoing basis, especially from a challenger position (Levy and Scully 
2007). 
The concept of institutional work extends beyond a heroic rendition of institutional entrepreneurship, 
where the focus is often on dramatic success stories. It refers to the practices of individual and 
collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions (Lawrence et al. 2011) – it 
thus highlights processes rather than agents. The concept also problematizes how and with whom 
individuals gain their (institutionally embedded) agency, which is highly relevant for our problem of 
organizing for institutional change. While institutional work and institutional entrepreneurship 
emphasize different understandings of agency (Lawrence et al. 2011), both concepts are potentially 
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valuable for practitioners, with the former relevant for practices and processes, and the latter 
highlighting purposive action in opposition to existing institutional arrangements and the role of 
opportunity for agency.  
The literatures on institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work are mostly oriented toward 
developing social theory on institutional change. In the following review, we focus on the more 
pragmatic implications of this literature, i.e., propositions and empirical observations about 
characteristics of successful institutional change that might be relevant for practicing institutional 
entrepreneurs in their quest for more sustainable energy. Our review aims to identify propositions 
that most explicitly challenge technocratic notions of institutional change, such as the belief that the 
problem of energy efficiency can be resolved through rational analysis and control alone (Lutzenhiser 
2014), by suggesting that institutional entrepreneurs align several different types of work and 
resources, as elaborated in the sections below. 
1) Successful institutional entrepreneurs engage in technical, cultural and political work when 
creating new institutions. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) characterized three types of work in the 
creation of new institutions. Political work entails advocacy through social suasion, defining boundaries 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and vesting interested actors with certain roles and rights. For 
example, Wijen and Ansari (2007) have shown how various types of political work were used in the 
Kyoto climate negotiations: the creation of blocs to reduce complexity, the utilization of bandwagons 
to get new signatories abroad, the sanctioning via media surveillance, and ultimately, the use of 
bargaining to gain Russia on board. Technical work involves “theorization” of the institutional form, 
the creation of links between novel and institutionalized practices, as well as the education of others 
to use these new models (Perkmann and Spicer 2008). For example, Jolly et al. (2016) show how 
increased wind power diffusion requires a conceptual reconfiguration of the power grid to 
accommodate for intermittent and distributed generation. Cultural work focuses on institutional 
diffusion (Hargrave and van de Ven 2006) and the creation of legitimacy by framing the new institutional 
arrangement so as to appeal to wider cultural values in the context (Perkmann and Spicer 2008). For 
example, Jolly et al. (2016) have shown how civil society groups have campaigned for wind energy mainly 
on environmental grounds in Finland, whereas Indian civil society groups have stressed economic and 
societal values, such as impacts on ordinary consumers and rural populations.  
2) The creation of new institutions often also depends on the disruption of old ones. The importance 
of disruption or destabilization of existing institutions has been highlighted by several authors (Oliver 
1991; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Kivimaa and Kern 2016), yet Fuenfschilling and Truffer (2016) claim 
it is the least studied form of institutional work. Path dependency is well acknowledged in the study of 
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energy systems (Unruh 2000; Lovio et al. 2011; Lockwood et al., 2017). The complex co-evolution of 
technologies and institutions involves, for example, unions and industry associations that emerge to 
represent energy professionals servicing technological system, and formal government institutions to 
regulate it, with a tendency to persist through mechanisms of positive feedback (Unruh, 2000). 
Governments can use positive reinforcement mechanisms associated with path dependency either to 
support existing fossil fuel energy based institutions or to create new institutions around clean energy 
(Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013). Disruptive entrepreneurship undermines the mechanisms causing 
compliance with social institutions, i.e., undermining core beliefs, disassociating moral foundations, or 
disconnecting sanctions through regulatory change (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Institutional 
entrepreneurs can engage in such disruption, or seek times and places where such disruption is under 
way (Dorado 2005). In the case of the global energy system, the latter is a more likely avenue, though 
agents can attempt to amplify disruptive changes.  
3) Institutional work requires social skill, i.e., the ability to use empathy to select the most fitting 
strategies and tactics to mobilize allies and deal with opponents in each situation. Social skill is 
highlighted in the institutional entrepreneurship literature as a way for ‘challengers’ to leverage scarce 
and critical resources (Maguire et al. 2004; Levy and Scully 2007; Battiliana et al. 2009), and authors 
draw heavily here on Fligstein’s (1997; 2008) work. Social skill is the ability to read people and 
environments, interpret the actions of others in the field, and select appropriate tactics for attaining 
co-operation (Fligstein 2008), such as brokering and maintaining goallessness, or aggregating interests, 
or even engaging in agenda setting.  In the case of change in a structured field like the energy sector, 
challengers need to select their tactics for dealing with powerful incumbent groups (Fligstein 1997; 
Fligstein 2008). Here, institutional entrepreneurs rely on skilled outmaneuvering of incumbents, 
combined with “hegemonic accommodation”, i.e., the compromises required to position new 
institutional arrangements within entrenched institutions (Levy and Scully 2010). Fligstein (1997) 
outlines alternative tactics for dealing with incumbents, such as taking what the system gives, strategic 
bargaining, acting as a disinterested broker, maintaining ambiguity and strategically hiding agendas, 
plotting multiple courses of action, and networking to other challengers.  
4) Successful institutional entrepreneurship also depends on the opportunity structure of the 
institutional environment (field) and institutional entrepreneurs’ capabilities in interpreting them. 
Objective and perceived structures of institutional fields offer different opportunities for change. 
Industrial fields with a strong field infrastructure (such as the energy system) tend to follow a single 
dominant logic, and hence are likely to follow a pathway of incremental change (Dorado 2006; Zietsma 
et al. 2017), though technological change may at a certain point reconfigure the entire structure of the 
field (Zietsma et al. 2017). In contrast, some fields may exhibit a plurality of institutional logics, which 
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makes them amenable to leveraging by politically skilled institutional entrepreneurs (Dorado 2006; 
Zietsma et al. 2017). In between these two extremes are ambiguous fields, where multiple institutional 
referents vie for authority (Dorado 2006; Zietsma et al. 2017). Since fields are structured by rules, 
exchange and obdurate infrastructures, but also by meanings and sensemaking by participants (Suddaby 
2010; Zietsma et al. 2017), some actors may perceive opportunities even in highly structured or 
ambiguous fields. For example, when institutional logics are ambiguous (e.g., when new industries like 
the ICT sector and new logics like climate concern start to invade the energy field), institutional 
entrepreneurs can create new institutional arrangements through “convening” participants from diverse 
institutional fields into a collective sensemaking process (Dorado 2006).  
The opportunity structures of institutional fields have a temporal structure, as well. Often, change is 
precipitated by some kind of disruption or crisis in the existing institutional arrangements (Hoffman 
1999; Fligstein 2008; Battiliana et al. 2009). Yet opportunities for institutional entrepreneurship can 
also derive from gradually evolving socio-economic changes, such as contradictions and tensions within 
existing institutions (Beckert 2010).  In globally linked technological systems like the energy system, 
disruptions like the German decision to phase out nuclear power and gradual processes like the 
development of PV manufacturing capabilities in China can create chains of events that start to create 
tensions within the system (such as the steep decline in PV module prices). Prior research in the energy 
field also suggests that opportunities might not only be created by crises, but also by the maturation 
of supportive technologies (such as ICTs and digitalization), creating industry convergence (Erlinghagen 
and Markard 2012; Canzler et al. 2017). 
5) Timing is critical in capturing opportunities for institutional change.  There is an established 
literature on the role of timing and temporal events in the institutional and policy change literatures 
(Kingdon 1984; Birkland 1998; Hardy and McGuire 2010). Institutional entrepreneurs need to be 
organized for long enough for auspicious temporal conditions to coincide: For example, unbeknownst 
to the change agents, changes in higher-order fields can destabilize the focal field where change is 
sought, thus enabling change that was previously impossible (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Buhr (2012) 
describes how a window of opportunity opened for emissions trading in the aviation industry when 
three streams (problem, policy and political, see Kingdon 1984) were favorable at the same time, and 
a collective of institutional entrepreneurs was able to gear their activities to these temporal conditions. 
While several streams of literature have explored the impacts of focusing (Birkland 1998) and field-
configuring (Hardy and McGuire 2010) events, there is less research on whether institutional 
entrepreneurs could systematically capture the opportunities created by such events (Müller-Seitz and 
Schüßler 2013). This is particularly the case in the energy field, where global and national 
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developments occur at different paces, and change is punctuated, complex and irreducible to a single 
cause (Sovacool 2016). 
6) From an organizational perspective, the above characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship 
suggest a mode of action where grand strategizing and everyday tactics are aligned.  In a rare 
discussion on how people organize for institutional entrepreneurship, Levy and Scully (2007) have 
drawn on Gramsci’s (1957/2011) Modern Prince to characterize institutional entrepreneurship as 
employing a “strategic face of power” by merging grand strategy with organizational agility: skillfully 
deploying scarce resources, analyzing field conditions, creating alliances and responding to changing 
conditions. From this perspective, organizing for institutional entrepreneurship draws together 
practices and functions that often are separated in conventional bureaucracies (Canzler et al. 2017).  
 
3. Research Context and Methods 
National energy systems are usually treated as their own fields (Hess 2013; Jolly et al 2016) but they 
are also interconnected via transnational ownership and regulation, transmission grids, and shared 
professional standards, beliefs and practices. Within internationally interconnected energy fields, 
institutional entrepreneurship occurs in several places: in companies producing sustainable energy 
products and services, in established industries, in NGOs or, importantly, among think thanks, 
academia and consultancies. We chose to focus on government-affiliated organizations with a 
mandate to promote sustainable energy, who often translate international developments into the 
local context. We considered they could benefit the most from a reconceptualization of their work in 
terms of institutional entrepreneurship, considering the history of government and its affiliates as 
classic bureaucracies, and recent reforms of the public sector (Andrews-Speed 2016).  
We locate our empirical work in Finland, a country whose historical industrial structure is dominated 
by heavy industry. As a result, the energy field has been dominated by a close elite: a cohesive group 
consisting of the main political parties, the Ministry of Employment and Economy, energy companies, 
and large energy-intensive businesses (Ruostetsaari, 2010a). Elite members come from the same 
schools, share the same ideals, and throughout history, have created common field-level rules, which 
emphasize security of supply, affordable energy, an engineering ethic, and the importance of 
economies of scale (Ruostetsaari, 2010; Salo, 2014).  
The incumbent institutional and industrial structure has made the introduction of distributed, small-
scale energy production extremely difficult, since policy attention has traditionally been devoted to 
providing dense energy sources for industry.  As a result, Finland was quite late to introduce a feed-in-
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tariff for some forms of renewables in 2011, and even then, small installations (<100 kVa) were 
excluded. Finland has been the only country in Europe that has offered no dedicated support for 
domestic solar panel installations. The incumbent institutional and industrial structure has also 
hindered non-industrial energy efficiency, since heavy industry has relatively high energy costs and 
hence has devoted historically much attention to energy efficiency, resulting in belated attention to 
other than core industrial processes, where significant potential was still identified by Lund (2007). 
Our study was developed in collaboration with the two leading organizations in the field in Finland, 
Sitra and Motiva, with which the authors have collaborated for decades, and which have been shown 
to work from outside the incumbent energy elite to challenge existing institutional arrangements and 
introduce new ones (reference removed for review).  
Sitra is a foundation set up by the Finnish government in 1967 originally to renew the country’s 
industrial structure. Sitra’s activities are mandated in law, its operations overseen by the Parliament. 
It is independent of the state budget due to funding via the returns on an endowment capital. With a 
staff of 100, Sitra engages in a variety of domains, such as healthcare, energy and sustainable economy, 
through projects with a bounded lifespan. Sitra has been described as an organization with an explicit 
aim to disrupt existing institutional structures and create new ones (reference removed for review). 
Since the organization works on fixed-term projects with ad-hoc teams, Sitra’s interest in collaborating 
with our project was to develop more systematic ways to learn as an organization from success and 
failure in fixed-term projects.  
Motiva was established by the Finnish government as a project run by a handful of entrepreneurial 
energy engineers in 1993, which has played a key role in creating new institutional arrangements for 
energy efficiency (Khan 2006). Since 2000, Motiva has been a limited liability company, which is the main 
implementer of energy efficiency policy in Finland. Its mission is defined by the government, but also by 
the energy engineering expertise concentrated in the company and its 57 employees. Today, Motiva 
offers services to the central government, but increasingly markets its services to local government, 
businesses and consumers in energy efficiency, renewable energy and materials efficiency solutions. 
Motiva’s interest in collaborating in our project was to better leverage the company’s original capabilities 
in mobilizing other organizations on its currently much larger scale of operations than in its early days. 
These organizations work for institutional change– from different but converging directions –  within 
an energy field that has been characterized as elitist and highly stable (Ruostetsaari 2010). Within this 
context, energy experts – including proponents of energy efficiency and renewable energy – 
nonetheless still tend to build their arguments on the institutionally prescribed notions of rational 
choice and technical potential, while downplaying the social and political aspects of change.  
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The aim of this study is not to compare the processes found in the two organizations. Rather, we use 
these two different collaborative inquiry processes to identify interpretations that were common to 
both organizations, as well as ideas for how to organize for institutional change that arise from two 
different organizational contexts within the same institutional field. 
3.1 Research process: joint reflection on selected projects 
In order to see how the concepts from the institutional entrepreneurship literature enable 
organizations to reflect on their own ways of working to accomplish change, we initiated a process for 
joint exploration (van de Ven and Johnson 2006). This process aimed to enable a critical inquiry of 
whether these practitioners felt they needed the  institutional entrepreneurship literature in order to 
understand the political dimensions of their work, whether they were interested in learning more about 
the political nature of their work, and whether they felt they could improve the effectiveness of their 
political work. 
Drawing on Shani et al. (2012) and Reason and Bradbury (2012), we organized an iterative reflection 
process of two and a half years consisting of the following steps (see figure 1): 
1) Initial interview with the senior managers in charge of the energy systems change process. In 
the case of Motiva, this was the CEO accompanied by the CIO, in the case of Sitra (which has 
several focal areas), it was the director of the Energy Programme.  
2) Initial learning histories based on interviews and documents (project materials and reports, 
self-evaluations, participant lists). 
3) Group discussion for key staff members involved in the change initiative.  




Figure 1. Flow chart and timeline of research process 
To contextualize, we used a previously collected dataset on the same organizations offering a 
comprehensive view of the organizations’ programs, their ways of working, their position vis-à-vis key 
institutions and other actors in their field, as well as external stakeholders’ views of their achievements 
(reference removed for review), which complemented our own insights from several years of 
collaboration. The dataset consisted of 10 staff interviews, six interviews with stakeholders, 15 
publications (e.g. project reports) and 77 project websites/news releases. These focused, in particular, 
on the extent to and ways in which these organizations could be seen as achieving systemic (institutional) 
change in the energy field. 
The purpose of the initial interview (1) was to reach an agreement on the collaborative inquiry process 
and its aims and to select a particular change initiative for joint investigation and reflection. We 
decided to focus on a “success story” in order to develop commitment to the study. In the case of 
Motiva, the selected case was one of its first assignments, the Energy Audit Programme, running since 
1993, from which the organization wanted to learn for its new Materials Efficiency Audit Programme. 
In the case of Sitra, a recent programme called Self-Produced Energy (2011-2013) was chosen, which 
had accomplished some small but spectacular inroads into the incumbent energy system. It was agreed 
that the organizations would allocate about 20 person-hours to the joint investigation process2. In the 
                                                             
2 In fact, in the end, they probably used somewhat more, since the extent of follow-up interviews and 
reviewing the ‘stories’ and the final manuscript were not clearly envisaged at this point.  
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initial interview, we also identified the basics of the selected change process (context, goal, timeline, 
success indicators, participants) and relevant documents.  
On the basis of this, we wrote an initial “story” (2) containing the bare bones and timeline of the change 
project for further discussion and revision in the group discussion (this served as our first 
operationalization of the institutional entrepreneurship concepts, and is reflected in a more 
elaborated form in the stories of the institutional entrepreneurs presented in section 4.1).  
The aim of the group discussion (3) was to engage in joint reflection on the “story” of the 
entrepreneurial project, its successes and shortcomings, the resources and strategies used in the 
process, and the (organizational) environmental conditions enabling or hindering the change process. 
We then gave a short presentation introducing key concepts and empirical examples from the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature (Annex 1). This was followed by joint reflection on whether 
these concepts and examples are helpful for abstracting lessons from the organization’s lived 
experience (our second operationalization of the institutional entrepreneurship concepts, reflected in 
the analysis presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3). The format of group discussion (Kitzinger and Barbour 
1999) was selected because it enables deliberation by individuals with diverse perspectives. We also 
deemed a group discussion more helpful for the organizations themselves, though as a drawback, 
perhaps some individual insights were lost (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999), some of which came up in 
later interviews. The group discussion organized in Sitra involved five participants from the Self-
Produced Energy project, including the director of the Energy Programme. In Motiva also, five people 
were involved – three veterans of the Energy Audit Programme, a younger expert working to establish 
a Materials Efficiency Programme, and the CEO. The focus group discussions were recorded and 
transcribed. 
Reflection on lessons learned from the process was conducted in sets of follow-up interviews (4) 
(Annex 1). The interviews aimed to identify the value of (a) the joint reflection process, (b) the use of 
concepts from the institutional entrepreneurship literature (including reflections on issues debated in 
the group discussion), as well as (c) how the organizations might use the analysis in further work. First, 
the senior managers and one other participant in both groups were interviewed eight months after 
the group discussion (face-to-face or by telephone) to discover what they had retained from the 
discussion and what they plans they had for their organization. Next, the same senior managers and 
other participants were interviewed about two years after the discussions to capture lasting 
impressions and experiences in putting the concepts into practice (see Annex 1). The interviews were 
recorded where possible and transcribed; when not possible, careful notes were made. Table 1 
outlines the number and type of participants engaged in different parts of the study.  
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Table 1. Data collection and participants at different stages of the collaborative inquiry 
Data collection stage Number of participants Duration Function in organization 
Initial interview 2 (Motiva) 
1 (Sitra) 






3 h CEO, 3 senior experts and one junior 
expert 
Program director, program manager, 3 
program experts 




1 h CEO + one senior expert (due to retire) 
Program director and senior expert 




1-1.5 h CEO + 2 senior experts 
Program director + 3 program experts 
* the ideal would have been to interview all focus group participants two years after the interview, but several had left the 
organization due to other jobs/retirement, and some had moved to different positions. 
 
3.2 Analysis 
We analysed the data in three stages, partly overlapping with data generation. First, on the basis of 
the available documents, an overview report of the change process under study was developed using 
categories perceived as being recognizable to the organizations: context, goals, timeline of events, 
achievements, ways and means of working, and stakeholders and networks involved. Deductive 
elements from the literature guided our attention in this process, but we operationalized key 
institutional change concepts using “emic” expressions (our first operationalization). This report was 
then revised based on the transcripts of the group discussions to produce narratives of the change 
process. These are composite narratives of the experiences of different people, where participants in 
the focus group discussions did part of the composition through sensemaking and joint reflection 
(Weick 1995), while we as external authors added chronologization, localization, focalization and 
verbalization (see O’Neill 1996) by organizing the focus group material and combining it with reports 
and documents from the projects. 
In our inductive analysis of the usefulness of the concepts from the institutional entrepreneurship 
literature, we drew on the transcripts of the group discussion and transcripts or detailed notes from 
the feedback interviews. Following Van de Ven and Johnson (2006), we used a dialectical process of 
arbitrage to juxtapose practitioner viewpoints with propositions from the literature. We compared and 
categorized the data in terms of which concepts engendered debate, agreement, criticism or 
elaboration to produce our second operationalization of the change process (figure 2). Through this 
process, we compared the elements of the practitioner narratives to the concepts from the 
institutional entrepreneurship literature, and examined where the concepts fit and where there were 
potential sources of tension. This entailed collaborative analysis, mutual criticism and several rounds 
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of revision among the co-authors. As an example, we explored the concept of social skill: which events 
and excerpts from the interview reflected social skill and recognition of it within the organization, 
whether the participants’ understanding of it was similar to that of Fligstein and McAdams’ (2012), and 
what social skill might entail in the energy field at different points in time and in closer or more distant 
communities of participants. This helped us to both reinterpret the stories or the participants and 
critically interrogate the concept of social skill. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison and juxtaposition of practitioner viewpoints with propositions from the literature 
The third stage entailed reflection on the value of the concepts for the individuals and organizations 
involved. This drew on data both from the focus group discussions and the follow-up interviews. Here, 
drawing on Shani et al. (2012) we sought to identify how the concepts helped to render different forms 
of work more or less legitimate, and how these concepts might be put into practice in the 
organizations. We again juxtaposed and interrogated the participants’ suggestions with the literature 
on how organizational form and capabilities might support institutional entrepreneurship (Levy and 
Scully 2007).  
The analysis, including the “stories”, was finally validated by participants. This was done by sending a 
draft version of the entire article to the participants interviewed in the first follow-up round, to which 
we got email responses saying those participants agreed, and they were also discussed during the first 
follow-up interviews. The interviewees agreed on the stories, though some wanted to further 






4. Findings: Stories and Analysis of Institutional Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Energy 
In the following, we first (section 4.1.) tell the stories of the institutional entrepreneurs, focusing on 
what they have done. We then (section 4.2) go on to discuss how the concepts from the institutional 
entrepreneurship were perceived of as helpful for the group in understanding its own story, and what 
insights were drawn for organizational development. 
4.1 The stories of the institutional entrepreneurs 
Sitra: Making room for distributed energy production.   A program called Self-Produced Energy was 
selected as a successful case of institutional entrepreneurship because of its radical and disruptive 
nature. In this program, Sitra had challenged entrenched beliefs in Finnish society, for example the 
belief that “big is beautiful” in energy production, as well as entrenched interests embodied in the 
powerful complex of the energy industry, other large industries, and the Ministry of Employment and 
Economy (MEE).  
Like all Sitra’s program, Self-Produced Energy was a temporally bounded initiative aiming to accelerate 
the transformation of the Finnish energy system. It emerged fairly late in the course of the four-year 
energy program, when Sitra discovered that Finland was lagging behind other European countries in 
distributed renewable energy production and support for citizens as producers of solar power. Sitra 
had gained hands-on experience on the viability of existing PV technology through a model construction 
of a net-zero energy building (a building that produced as much energy with PV as it consumed on an 
annual basis). Hence, the team deemed the time ripe for an effort to accelerate the roll-out of distributed 
renewable energy, such as solar and wind power. 
In the Finnish context, this was a formidable task. Finland was (and remains) the only European country 
that offers no financial support for household-scale solar power production and where the expert 
community was for decades skeptical of solar power. The country’s energy policy had been tardy in 
acknowledging the worldwide breakthrough of solar power. Because of this, several barriers that had 
been removed in other countries (such as difficulties in permitting, grid connections and the lack of 
guaranteed markets – to say nothing of subsidized prices - for local solar power) persisted in Finland. For 
example, even the 2011 introduction of a feed-in-tariff for renewable energy excluded micro-scale solar 
and other renewable energy installations.  
It was in this unfriendly environment that the Self-Produced Energy Programme was launched. The 
stated aims were to (1) Improve collaboration among actors involved in small-scale renewable energy 
production by creating a common brand and bargaining power (2)  Facilitate citizen energy production 
in terms of grid connections, permitting, services and cost-effectiveness and (3) Make renewable 
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energy an acceptable part of the living environment by supporting a shift from a NIMBY (not-in-my-
backyard) to a YIMBY (yes-in-my-back-yard) attitude through participatory decision-making and 
models for distributing benefits within the community. In this sense, the programme was clearly more 
political and less technocratic than a conventional energy programme. 
The program was conducted in a highly networked and interactive way within less than three years. 
The team analysed citizen opinion and barriers to renewable energy production and brought together 
the fragmented community of renewable energy enthusiasts. They used blogs, platforms, social media 
and workshops to both convene and shape the interests of the emerging small-scale renewable energy 
community, which grew through ‘snowballing’ and events to entice new people into the community. 
Networks were particularly important to get the technical experts in small-scale renewable energy and 
the local innovators and energy prosumers on board, and these people actually offered technical 
solutions to problems. Hence, this process was not only about mobilizing the community, but 
simultaneously about fact-finding, the development and diffusion of a shared terminology, and the 
analysis of problems alongside a search for potential solutions. Experimentation is an important 
buzzword in Sitra, and the team used experiments in many ways: organizing joint purchasing of solar 
panels, design of a turnkey service, and a shared web platform for community energy projects and 
crowdsourced investment. Sitra also engaged in piloting new services and making venture capital 
investments, i.e., tools that are distinctive of Sitra’s mode of operation (reference removed for review). 
Moreover, resources were devoted to influencing public opinion, MPs, and key power holders such as 
the Finnish Energy Industry and the MEE. 
As a result, several changes in the field were accomplished. One of the great battles and victories was 
the facilitation of grid connections, which had previously been legally possible but technically difficult 
due to idiosyncratic national standards for inverters (i.e, the technical interface linking solar panels to 
the distribution grid). The opening up of the standard for imported inverters was the result of 
significant lobbying vis-à-vis the Finnish Energy Industries and the MEE. Another victory was the 
creation of a simple and user-friendly form for customers to fill in when they wanted their equipment 
connected to the grid. This form was also expected to soften attitudes among distribution grid 
operators, since Sitra funded a related project by the Finnish Energy Industries to train the grid 
operators to support prosumer grid connections – and thus perhaps finally take consumers seriously 
as energy producers. Sitra also managed to get ten action points on distributed energy into the 
Government’s Energy and Climate Strategy, and the development of services for small-scale energy 
onto the agenda of the main technology funding body, Tekes. Three working groups in government 
bodies were set up to promote small-scale energy production. Last but not least, the mobilization of 
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the fragmented and marginalized business community dealing with distributed energy culminated in 
the establishment of a new industry association, the Finnish Local Renewable Energy Association. 
While the small team working on this at Sitra celebrated their victories, they felt they had won the 
battle but not the war. After Sitra stopped pushing, most government working groups quietly finished 
their work without visible results. No financial support for citizen PV materialized (e.g. feed-in-tariffs 
or net metering systems available in other countries), and there were still no dedicated financial 
services for small-scale renewable investments. Permitting processes for wind power were still 
laborious and community-owned projects were rare. The time available had been too short for 
fundamental change. Still, some of the team felt they had crossed a critical threshold and that things 
would move forward on their own momentum. 
Motiva: Institutionalization of energy audits in Finland. The Energy Audit Programme was selected 
by the CEO of Motiva as a success story because it entailed the creation of a new institution that 
enjoyed significant buy-in and participation by Finnish companies and municipalities. The program is 
governed by the MEE and operated by Motiva. At the time of the study, about 80% of industrial, 
tertiary and municipal buildings had been energy audited. The program is considered an exemplar in 
Europe due to its wide voluntary support, credibility, standardization and monitoring. The current 
achievements are the result of 20 years of dedicated work, which has been emblematic for the entire 
identity of Motiva. 
Energy audits are one way to address the “energy efficiency gap”, i.e., the significant energy efficiency 
potential that is not realized because individuals, organizations and society under-invest in energy 
efficiency (Geller and Attali 2005). Energy audits aim to remove barriers to such investment through 
systematic analysis and valuation of the energy efficiency potential in a given facility and 
recommendations for cost-effective energy efficiency measures. Yet, without a standardized format, 
audits initially suffered from a credibility gap that impeded investors from capturing the “low-hanging 
fruit” of cost-effective energy efficiency investments.  
Energy audits had been around since the energy crisis. In Finland, the MEE (then Ministry of Trade and 
Industry) had supported energy audits since the early 1980s with variable success. Interest in energy 
audits waned in the late 1980s as energy prices declined and the economy rebounded from the 
recession. When Motiva, then established as an energy efficiency project supported by the Ministry, 
developed its first standard audit model and launched a training and accreditation program for 
auditors, industry interest grew and companies started to have their facilities energy audited. This 
occurred at an opportune time, in the early 1990s, when Finland was in deep recession, and many 
engineering companies suffered from a lack of their usual business. It was not until the Ministry of 
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Trade and Industry launched a voluntary energy agreements program in 1997 (with commitments by 
signatories to conduct audits and make improvements, and commitments by the ministry to subsidize 
the audit costs) that energy auditing took off on a large scale. In the ensuing years, both the energy 
auditing program and the voluntary agreements program grew with the addition of new audit models 
tailored to the specifics of particular industries and operations.  
The audit program was organized to be compatible with the close networks characteristic of Finnish 
business and the engineering community. Audit models were developed in co-operation with energy 
engineering companies, piloted and improved before they were finalized. Feedback was collected from 
“audit users”, i.e., companies in which audits were conducted. Credibility was gained through training 
and qualification of auditors, and the development of a central monitoring system of audit results. The 
state subsidies supported this registering of energy audit reports, since subsidies were paid out after 
submission of the report. Hence, Motiva was able to monitor quality and compile results on an annual 
basis, as well as take action and disaccredit auditors that failed to comply with the requirements of the 
scheme. 
The energy audit scheme had at the time of study been running for two decades. During this time, it 
had expanded from a simple focus on the energy efficiency in buildings to several industrial processes, 
transport logistics and renewable energy deployment. The energy audit program has resulted in 
significant investments in energy efficiency, which were estimated as reducing total energy 
consumption in Finland by about 3 TWh per year (Ministry of Employment and Economy 2011), i.e., 
almost 1% of total energy consumption. This success had encouraged Motiva to apply the concept to 
the promotion of materials efficiency in industry, where a similar audit scheme has been established.  
4.2 Legitimate and illegitimate political work 
The stories presented above reflect institutional entrepreneurship in changing the rules of the energy 
system by disrupting existing practices or creating new institutions to address systemic problems. Yet 
until the study, the participants had not perceived themselves as institutional entrepreneurs, even 
though they immediately identified with the notion, albeit though they preferring the term “change 
agents”. In the following, we focus on political work (one category of institutional work) which we 
found to be poorly articulated and not quite legitimate in our case organizations at the outset.  
In the Motiva group, political work was discussed most through the concept of social skill, which they 
perceived as a concept that was both novel and familiar. It was first linked to the capabilities in 
managing social interaction resulting from long-term relationships between people: 
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That’s very important when we do these new things with companies … how to read the game. 
Especially when you have competitors around the table, to be able to manage the discussion and 
to know, well, you can’t go in this direction, but maybe you can go in that direction. It is sort of 
easy, since you have years of history of working with them. 
The discussant offering the comment above interpreted social skill as a “naturally occurring” personal 
characteristic embedded in a history of personal relationships. She emphasized the embodied nature 
of social skill and the effort and risk of personal reputation that it may require (see Lawrence et al. 
2009). In contrast, another discussant felt that social skill strategies were conscious practices of the 
organization. Here, social skill presented itself as operating on a tactical level of personal interaction, 
but gaining leverage when combined with a strategic analysis of the opportunity environment.   
The Sitra discussants also recognized that political work was something they actually engaged in, even 
though they had not recognized it as such, or viewed its different elements as being interconnected. 
Indeed, the notion of political work served to ennoble some of the back-breaking efforts around “little 
things”. For example, the Sitra team had spent a lot of time workshopping with allies, rather than 
promoting their own solution (much in the way of Dorado’s, 1995, ‘convening’), i.e., putting political 
work in first position. Furthermore, they pointed out that they had also involved allies in the technical 
work of prioritizing the plethora of problems hindering the development of small-scale renewable 
energy. An example was taken from one of the small victories, the development of a user-friendly 
standard form for small scale energy producers to gain connection to the grid, where technical work 
concerning the content and organization of the form was interspersed with cultural considerations 
about legitimacy vis-à-vis grid operators and their customers, and political work to engage grid 
operators in the process.  
However, not all forms of political work were seen as legitimate. Some of the discussants from Sitra 
took issue with the idea that political work might involve such practices as bargaining alongside the 
development of genuine commitment among allies. They were upset by an example we presented 
from Wijen and Ansari (2007), where bargaining was used in the Kyoto protocol negotiations to “buy” 
Russia’s signature by promising more favorable terms for WTO accession. The discussants admitted 
that bargaining does occur in energy policy making, but they felt it “might not be sustainable” in the 
long term. Their own initiative had aimed to create commitment to common goals by aggregating the 
interests of the fragmented players in the field and establishing a broader community of practice 
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), rather than to buying allies with ulterior incentives. They thus 
suggested that some forms of political work might only be relevant for “end games” rather than for 
organizations promoting change as a going concern. However, these was a lot of debate in the Sitra 
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team about political work vis-à-vis energy incumbents. One discussant exclaimed that they had not 
made “a proper lobbying campaign”, implying that they had not devoted sufficient attention to 
disrupting existing belief systems among the ruling elite. The others concurred that they had worked 
in a “nice and polite fashion” (some felt, even too polite) toward parties identified as counterforces to 
the change they wanted to promote:  
We have organized lunches and invited them to private meetings, because we are privileged to be 
able to do that. Which isn’t about money but about assembling people around a table. In the case 
of this recommendation paper [concerning support to small scale energy production], it was very 
concretely about sending a lunch invitation to X, Y and Z and then, sort of, presenting our views 
and [suggesting] wouldn’t it be nice if we could present a common proposal. And then when 
everyone is nodding, hey presto, we have a common proposal. … it involves elements of making 
others feel they are in control and acting as a disinterested broker and aggregating interests. 
Some discussants interjected that the outcome of this process, the recommendation paper, had taken 
ages to finalize and had not eventually included game-changing proposals. Rather than explicitly 
focusing on institutional disruption (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), the way of working followed the 
organization’s institutionally embedded mode of operating as a change-promoting part of the elite. 
Given the many frustrations of trying to change the energy system, our reason to engage  practitioners 
was to see whether they could gain insights that help them “work smarter”, i.e., enhance their capacity 
to do political work. As a result of our intervention, political work did become more explicit – and in 
part, more legitimate. This is visible in comments where political skills, means, ends, strategies and 
tactics were seen as deserving more explicit reflection, including criticism (Table 2). Moreover, the 
process appeared to have made room for fundamental reflection on the organizations’ positioning, as 
well as their institutionalized capacities and incapacities. The last comment in Table 2 illustrates the 
insight that concepts from institutional entrepreneurship literature can also challenge organizations 
(or at least some people working in them) to reflect on the institutionally embedded capabilities and 




Table 2. Illustrative quotes of how political aspects of institutional change gained legitimacy 
Development of social 
skill alongside technical 
expertise 
Some people have a natural skill, but we try to develop people’s [our staff’s] 
capacity. So if we want to promote something, but we show up with a nice neat 
package, then our customers will say “not now” and “not interested”. We need 
to develop the capacity to plant seeds, listen and put aside our own expertise, 
rather than teach people! 
Analytical approach to 
institutional change 
We could also think about this: we easily jump into the action and start doing 
and promoting things. But certainly, at some point, it would be good to 
analytically examine our strategies and the best thing would be if all our 
programme plans could be conceptualized on this level [systematic analysis of 
types of institutional work and their timing].  
Reflection on the political 
and institutional 
positioning of the 
organization 
We should think more about what we are, what we want to be, and if what we 
are isn’t what we want to be, how we could get there. And we do reflect on our 
role … and have different views. Some people think we should be careful and not 
commit too much to one particular agenda to avoid bias, and then there are 
others who think it wouldn’t really hurt if we did. 
Reflection on appropriate 
means to ends 
I am also a bit critical. We spent a lot of time workshopping and engaging 
partners .... That’s the organization’s standard practice … And bargaining is not 
an acceptable practice, there are certain ways of doing things. 
 
4.3 Aligning opportunity recognition with everyday social skill tactics: a game of luck or chance? 
It was easy for our practitioners to recognize the notion that opportunities for change depend on 
structural and temporal field conditions. The group discussions also revealed that this aspect of change 
initiatives had not been previously analysed collectively. Insights from the literature on opportunity 
structures of institutional environments (Dorado 2005, Beckert 2010; Buhr 2012) served to invoke re-
analysis of the focal stories presented above, but also discussion on other stories or potential scenarios 
for the future. The Motiva team agreed that they had benefited from favorable organizational 
environmental conditions in the golden early days of their energy audit scheme. The notion of 
“windows of opportunity” also inspired participants to think of ongoing projects and whether the time 
was ripe for them. However, the notion of opportunity-rich environments and moments was more 
apparent to them with reference to unsuccessful projects, where similar “sensible” ideas, such as the 
development of an environmental classification scheme for buildings in the 1990s (like today’s 
BREEAM and LEED green building certificates) had not been successful at the time. 
Wasn’t it so, [name of colleague], that we did a lot of hard work to promote classification schemes 
for green buildings? … It was something for which the time wasn’t ripe, it didn’t take off. … and 
then a few years later, maybe 4-5 years, all these international classification schemes emerged, 
which were almost the same.  
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For Sitra, the categorizations of opportunity structures of institutional environments evoked a 
discussion on whether the current energy system is in crisis or not, suggesting that participants did not 
share a common understanding of the opportunity structure of the field and had not discussed it 
before. They concluded that climate change was self-evidently a crisis, but one which had turned into 
a permanent condition failing to engender a sense of urgency. They agreed that if there were an overall 
high level of crisis consciousness, rapid change would be easier. The notion of “windows of 
opportunity” generated, among others, the following reflection: 
What might change the field? I am thinking of electricity storage, if there were a revolution in that 
area. It will come, but when? If households could store the electricity they need, for example, for 
three months ahead, then that would really be a game-changer, and the old system would just 
disintegrate.   
Proponents of alternative institutional arrangements need to be organized and stay organized until a 
window of opportunity arises from the confluence of different streams (Buhr 2012). The stories of our 
case organizations show how they have attempted to capture such opportunities in an emergent 
fashion (Lawrence and Phillips 2004). Perfect timing is likely to be beyond the active and strategic 
agency of institutional entrepreneurs working from a challenger position, as the quote above 
concerning electricity storage shows. Problem awareness can be monitored and allies can be mobilized 
proactively, yet whether they can stay organized long enough for a political opportunity to arise may 
in the end be a matter of luck. However, the discussants tended to believe that it is possible to develop 
a better (if not perfect) orientation toward “windows of opportunity”. This was mostly along the lines 
of emergent, contingent and reactive strategy (Lawrence and Phillips 2004). 
A recurring topic in the discussions and interviews was how the teams (and their wider organizations) 
combined  interpretations of field conditions, tactical moves, and social skill in the seemingly disparate 
domains of organizational strategy (a formal matter in government-affiliated organizations) and 
everyday social skill tactics on the ground. Even though organizational structures did not often support 
the above-mentioned ‘guerilla-style’ approach to institutional change, our participants had 
occasionally found ways to align grand strategizing and everyday tactics. This was more the case in 
Sitra, organized through project-based fixed-term teams, where on the other hand, the risks of “missed 
timing” were accentuated, since opportunity-rich events might occur after the project had disbanded. 
An organization working on the same topics, like Motiva, might have greater opportunities to capture 
temporal opportunities that unfold over a long time span, but over decades, organizations tend to 
institutionalize (Selznick  1996), and would require periodic disruption to enable the small 
entrepreneurial team to re-emerge. Indeed, this was ongoing in Motiva as our fieldwork ended. 
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While several insights were gained, it was not always clear to participants how their organization might 
improve its capacity for aligning everyday social skill tactics with grand strategizing. In Sitra, there had 
been an attempt to develop a checklist (on the basis of the presentation at the group discussion) for 
more analytical strategy development, enabling reflection on different types of work and the temporal 
opportunities for institutional change, but this had not penetrated into the formal strategy process. In 
Motiva, the introduction of cross-functional ‘flat’ teams was seen as a way to align opportunity 
recognition with everyday tactical work with customers and stakeholders.  
Several participants felt that reflective sessions, organized around case histories of past success and 
failure, would offer possibilities for the organization to learn. Indeed, our group discussion suggested 
that, in particular, recognition of temporal opportunity structures can benefit from an analysis of 
several cases, including failed ones, since opportune timing easily becomes ‘invisible’ in successful 
cases. Interestingly, people from both organizations suggested that such reflection should preferably 
be done together with outsiders.  
Our participants’ suggestions, initiatives (and the few measures taken) suggest that it might not be 
easy to institutionalize the capacity for institutional change within organizations. Many of the 
suggestions made concerned individuals and teams, rather than the organization as a whole. These 
included selecting people and teams with the right skill sets, mentoring and exchange of experience 
between veterans and novices, and ensuring a tight link between grand strategizing and work on the 
ground. Interestingly, here also organizational boundaries were viewed as permeable, as one 
discussant suggested that Sitra represents just one node in a learning process, where people working 
on short-term contracts in its projects gain experience, which they  carry to other organizations. Based 
on the case organizations’ experience and interpretations, institutional entrepreneurship for 
sustainable energy is more readily understood as a flexible capability of small groups, which may even 
span over organizational boundaries to combine skill (rather than planning) with serendipity (Lawrence 
and Phillips 2004).  
 
5. Discussion and limitations 
The primary purpose of the institutional entrepreneurship literature is not to support practitioners, 
but to inform sociological analysis of how institutionally embedded agents accomplish change. 
However, our research aimed to find out whether the institutional entrepreneurship literature could 
challenge practitioners’ understandings of institutional change  and help institutional entrepreneurs 
promoting sustainable energy to make sense of lived experience (Lawrence and Dover 2010) and 
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whether such an encounter with the literature gives rise to any new ideas about how to organize 
institutional sustainable energy entrepreneurship.  
5.1 Contribution to practice: Do conceptualizations of agency in institutional change help 
practitioners understand the political aspects of their work? 
Our analysis suggests that some practitioners, dedicated to promoting a more sustainable energy 
system, could benefit from institutional entrepreneurship scholarship. They might use it to develop a 
more political understanding of their (informal and unrecognized) ways of working and of the 
opportunities for change afforded by the temporal characteristics of the institutional environment. 
When practitioners recognize their implicit competencies in these terms, institutional work can gain a 
legitimate position alongside more technocratic expert work, for example, in recruiting and personnel 
development, in the way in which change initiatives are organized, and in organizational learning and 
development. Moreover, when the political aspects of institutional work become explicit, practitioners 
can also reflect on the relationships between appropriate ends and means, and potentially pick their 
battles to fit the means they are able to wield.  
We found the concepts of institutional work and temporal opportunity recognition to be easily 
recognizable to the participants, but discovered that they had not collectively or systematically 
discussed these issues before. The novelty of the institutional entrepreneurship framework for the 
participating organizations was the drawing of previously unconnected aspects of organizational 
strategizing and everyday social skill tactics into the same framework. Organizations do not necessarily 
have arenas devoted to such work, which would require the ongoing involvement of staff working on 
the ground in environmental scanning and strategizing. In our cases of promoting a more sustainable 
energy system, we are doubtful whether any organization working to change the energy system could 
be completely cognizant of the temporal conditions for change (cf. Buhr 2012) and capable of having 
everything in place when the time is right, considering the complex interrelations of global and national 
markets (Silvast, 2017), the large number of policies and technological developments (Kern et al., 
2017), as well as the diversity of potential allies and opponents. Nonetheless, our practitioners felt that 
social skill and environmental scanning could be better combined within their organizations, and had 
several suggestions for how this could be done.   
 
5.2 Theoretical challenges: Do insights from collaboration with practitioners contribute to the 
conceptualization of agency in institutional change? 
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Our findings present some theoretical challenges to the conceptualization of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The literature is somewhat obscure about whether institutional entrepreneurship is a 
characteristic of individuals or organizations (Levy and Scully 2007; Battiliana et al. 2012), and on whether 
the capturing of temporal opportunities is an issue of skill or luck, given the focus on successful cases.  
While the collective-action aspects of institutional entrepreneurship are emphasized (e.g. Hargrave and 
Van de Ven 2006; Levy and Scully 2007; Jolly et al. 2016), there is less attention to the structures and 
organizational institutionalization of key characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship (such as social 
skill). Our research extends the concept of social skill from the somewhat  individual-centric and tactical 
representations of the institutional entrepreneurship literature. Fligstein’s (1997; 2008) concept of social 
skill as a central resource for challengers is widely referenced in the literature, but not conceptualized as 
a characteristic of organizations. Levy and Scully (2007) have suggested that collective social skill might 
entail coordination across far-reaching analyses of field structures, an agile creative construction of 
alliances, and responsiveness to changes. More concretely, our analysis suggests that such capabilities 
might be cultivated through official recognition of organization members’ personal networks and 
embeddedness in a field, through mentoring and collective reflection on past experience (in particular, 
failures), through organizing in the form of cross-functional flat teams, as well as through joint reflection 
on experience with people outside the organization (cf. Canzler et al. 2017). This suggests that 
organizations can cultivate the capacity for institutional entrepreneurship. Further research might 
investigate whether such practices consistently predict success by organizations aiming to change 
institutional arrangements. 
Our research also contributes an insider perspective on the moral aspects of institutional 
entrepreneurship. The institutional entrepreneurship literature, since it focuses mainly on successful 
cases, does not explicitly highlight the constraints on entrepreneurship placed by organizations’ 
institutionalized moral orders.  In our case, government-affiliated organizations were not willing or 
capable to engage in “end-game” tactics like bargaining, due to their bridging role of aligning diverse 
interests in society, whereas this kind of tactic might be compatible with the moral order prevailing in a 
single-focus NGO or a political party. This insight has implications for authors pursuing institutional 
entrepreneurship as a way for mission-driven organizations to address grand challenges (Ferraro et al. 
2015): particular organizations might be enabled or constrained by their overall mission to wield 






There are certain limitations to the research design. The fact that people benefited from analysing 
their own experiences from a fresh perspective does not prove that the institutional entrepreneurship 
literature was uniquely enlightening. Some other type of literature might have been equally helpful 
(though we realized that the participating organizations were more familiar with, e.g., the more 
normative energy policy and transitions literatures than with the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship). There are also limitations in engaging practitioners in an analysis of institutional 
entrepreneurship strategies and tactics, given that people might not want to reveal strategies and 
tactics that are not completely legitimate. The use of group discussions as data sources also has its 
drawbacks in terms of social dynamics and limited time for each participant, potentially resulting in 
less reflection. Moreover, we were only able to engage a part of the organization for a bounded period. 
Our intervention was thus explorative rather than part of an organizational development effort. While 
we have continual close contacts with the organizations, we have no access to core strategy processes. 
Hence, the collaborative effort can be characterized as collaboration with the groups involved, rather 
than the full senior management (Shani et al. 2012). Even so, this type of process is likely to require 
close relationships of trust between academics and practitioners, which places limitations on the 
general applicability of such collaborative inquiry processes. 
Certain limitations pertain to the research context. Appropriate combinations of institutional work and 
political tactics are likely to depend on the position of the entrepreneurs (Lawrence and Suddaby 
2006). Sustainable energy promotion by government-affiliated organizations is likely to represent a 
particularly consensual kind of institutional entrepreneurship, due to the bridging role of government 
organizations in the energy field, which is both a market and an issue field (Zietsma 2017). Moreover, 
our organizations are from a country characterized by a consensual political culture (Lijphart 1999), 
which might be why some of our discussants voiced concerns about some forms of political work. 
Further research might explore similar work by NGOs or temporally bound campaigns, and in different 
political cultures, to challenge, extend or complement our findings. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have focused on institutional entrepreneurship in the energy field, which is highly path dependent, 
structured and dominated by hegemonic incumbents, yet challenged from many directions: by rapid 
technological change reducing the cost of renewables and energy efficiency solutions, by new entrants, 
social movements and by (more or less) determined climate policy in different countries. Institutional 
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change is created by these different forces, as well as by purposive actions by people in companies 
producing sustainable energy products and services, in established industries, in NGOs, think thanks, 
academia and consultancies. The change is global in nature, but proceeds at different paces in different 
national contexts. Government-affiliated organizations promoting sustainable energy are players in 
this field, attempting to actively shape national institutions in order to support the forces of change 
and disrupt forces obstructing change. Yet since they are institutionally embedded, they often frame 
and organize their work in terms drawn from incumbent institutions, devoting less attention to the 
political (Kuzemo 2014) and cultural nature of change in the energy system (Lutzenhiser 2014).  
This study explored the usefulness of insights from the institutional entrepreneurship literature for 
highlighting the political nature of the work of organizations promoting energy systems change.  
Through this, we aimed to empirically explore proposals that institutional entrepreneurship might 
support practical efforts toward positive social change (Ferraro et al. 2015). We did so through 
collaborative inquiry with two government-affiliated organizations whose experiences were 
articulated through the concepts of institutional entrepreneurship.  
Several other literatures have explored institutional and technological change in the energy sector: for 
example, innovation systems, sociotechnical transitions, path dependence and path creation, and 
policy innovation and governance  (Sovacool 2014; Araújo 2014). Greater engagement with these 
literatures might be equally valuable for practitioners, though many of them have outlined practical 
policy implications and are more familiar among government organizations (Heiskanen et al. 2009 Voß 
2014). Our study indicates that the unique value of engaging with the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship was to show that initiatives to change the institutional conditions of the energy field 
require somewhat different skills than business-as-usual policy development and implementation, and 
therefore require breaking the path dependencies both external and internal to the organisations 
taking on institutional entrepreneurship roles. The participating organizations had these skills, but they 
were under-appreciated in the organizations. In our case studies, institutional work served to mobilize 
allies, to create common understandings of new system configurations, and to create legitimizing 
narratives of new institutional arrangements such as distributed energy systems. However, 
practitioners in this field (in their challenger position) struggled to continually scan and capture the 
“windows of opportunity” created by the complex and multiscalar temporal conditions for change 
(Fligsten & McAdam 2012; Buhr 2012) prevalent in a global energy system characterized by rapid but 
punctuated and unpredictable technological and political change (Sovacool 2016).  
Engagement with practitioners based on the institutional entrepreneurship literature opened up space 
for new conversations on the institutional work required to create a new energy system, and on the 
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potentially collective nature of social skill. Practitioners envisaged that political work might gain a 
stronger position, alongside other forms of institutional work, through increased reflection on past 
success and failure, among veterans and novices, and together with outsiders. They also recognized 
the need for a stronger link between environmental scanning, grand strategizing and everyday tactics 
(Levy and Scully 2007), through a more guerilla-style (i.e., flexible, flat, action-oriented) organization 
ensuring that strategy development is aligned with work ‘on the ground’.  
While an alignment of grand strategy and everyday tactics might sound self-evident, it is not so in real-
life organizations or mainstream business books, in Finland or elsewhere. Opportunity recognition and 
the deployment of social skill in dealing with allies and opponents are often seen as separate processes 
in the management literature (Maula et al.  2013; Rutigliano et al. 2017), and policy development and 
implementation are separated in the policy literature (Luzenhiser 2014). Moreover, few practical 
management guides offer useful insight on timing (except for Albert 2013). Hence, there remains work 
in translating institutional entrepreneurship theory into practical management advice for promoting 
sustainable energy. Ideally, this management advice should engage sustainable energy practitioners 
alongside academics in order for it to be actionable, since different organizations’ moral orders allow 
for different forms of institutional entrepreneurship. 
For energy scholars investigating change on a grand scale, the implications of this research are to draw 
attention to the capabilities of organizations working – seemingly – in practical policy development 
and implementation. Energy policy change can – and needs to be – explained via large-scale historical 
forces (Rodríguez-Morales 2018), but these forces often require work in order to be aligned and 
mobilized through timely action (Buhr 2012; Jolly et al. 2016). Analysis of successful and failed 
transitions might thus devote greater attention to the role of institutional entrepreneurship by pivotal 
organizations or groups flexibly combining institutional work, social skill and environmental scanning. 
Our analysis further shows that while some organizations may have these capabilities naturally and 
implicitly, they can also be facilitated, cultivated and made explicit. This has practical implications for 
the types of organizational forms and capabilities that policymakers, academics and higher education 
institutions aiming for sustainable energy change should cultivate. Our study is unique as it pertains to 
a particular country and particular organizations, but it suggests there is promise for further 
exploration of the practical application of institutional entrepreneurship concepts for sustainable 
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Annex 1: Research instruments and materials used in the research process 
Outline of initial interview questions 
1) Introduction to the project: academic interest and potential benefits for the organization 
2) Plan for data collection, estimate of time allocation needed from organization 
3) Suggestions and discussion about change project to select, arguments for selection 
4) Aim and context, process and success criteria of selected project 
5) Identification of relevant participants and materials 
Outline of discussion points and slides from focus group discussions 
1) Story of local energy/enery audits + feedback on initial draft  
2) Concepts from institutional entrepreneurship (definition, contextualization, examples from 
the literature, e.g. Etzion and Ferraro 2006) 
3) Forms of institutional work: technical, political and cultural (Perkmann & Spicer 2008) 
examples (e.g. Tracey et al., 2011; Wijen and Ansari 2007; Levy & Scully 2007) 
4) Social skill: concept, selection of tactics for unstructured and structured fields (Fligstein 1997; 
2008) 
5) Opportunity structures of institutional fields: types of fields (Dorado 2005); crises (Hoffman 
1999) field configuring events (Hardy & McGuire 2010) 
6) Timing & opportunity structures (Fligstein & McAdam 2012; Buhr 2012) 
7) Reflection points: usefulness of concepts, roles of different types of institutional work, role of 
social skill, understanding the structure and temporal development of opportunities in the 
institutional environment 
Outline of questions, 1st feedback interviews 
1) Reflection on the ‘story’ of the change project, any new thoughts and directions? 
2) Concepts from the institutional entrepreneurship literature, what did you retain? Was 
anything important missing? 
3) Recapitulation of key points, have any of these been pursued further in your group/ 
organization? Could they support your future work in any additional ways? 
4) What has happened since the group discussion in terms of organizing for change agency? 
Outline of questions, 2nd feedback interviews 
1) Your organization’s work as a change agent today: strengths and weaknesses 
2) How is your work as a change agent reflected in your organizational structure and processes 
(review through institutional entrepreneurship concepts), and how has it changed over the 
years? 
3) Reflections on the group discussion and institutional entrepreneurship concepts introduced: 
were they helpful in any way? 
4) How is capacity for political work shared within the organization and how could it be shared? 
5) How is capacity for political work institutionalized in the organization? 
6) If a key concept is the combination of strategic analysis of the institutional environment with 
everyday social skill tactics, what alternative ways do you see for organizing for such work? 
Have any of these been taken into use? 
7) Are there internal and/or external barriers to organizing in these ways? 
